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Introduction
It has been a quarter of a century since the theoretical framework for the bank lending channel was laid down by Bernanke & Blinder (1988) . Researchers have gone on to assess a large body of empirical evidence of the bank lending channel in various countries and regions, so the dearth of work in China's case is somewhat surprising. Even more striking, perhaps, is the inconclusiveness of the existing studies on the lending channel dealing in the world's second largest economy. This paper, hopefully, is a small first step towards rectifying the situation by providing a rough description of the role of the bank lending channel in China.
Bank lending channel (BLC) theory suggests the effects of monetary policy extend beyond loan supply to banks. Traditionally, central banks rely on the BLC when (1) banks have limited access to non-deposit financing, that is, they lack other sources of external funding than deposits after the central bank tightens its monetary stance; and (2) enterprises are heavily dependent on bank lending, and specifically, they lack alternative sources of financing when the central bank tightens its monetary stance. In the case of China, both conditions appear to be met.
China's financial markets are still relatively underdeveloped and ill-equipped to efficiently supply financing to enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), in particular, are heavily dependent on bank lending for financing. Indeed, bank lending accounted for close to 80% of total social financing from 2000 to 2011 (see Figure 1 ).
As deposits are the main source of funds for commercial banks, China's central bank often resorts to quantitative monetary tools. From 2006Q4 to 2011Q4, the People's Bank of China (PBoC) adjusted the required reserve ratio 35 times. This constant fussing with rates appears aimed at influencing the availability of funds for lending. Looking closer at the liability structure of commercial banks, we see that bank loans based on deposits constituted 78% of social lending at the end of 2011. China's underdeveloped non-deposit market further implies that banks are sensitive to adjustments in the required reserve ratio.
China's high degree of state-ownership also makes it easy for the central bank to use the bank lending channel. Compared to privately held commercial banks, state-owned banks can be used by the state to pursue macroeconomic goals such as stable growth rather than simple profit maximization or acquiring market share（Micco & Ugo, 2006; Fungacova et al., 2011; Bertay et al., 2012 ). China's 4-trillion-yuan stimulus in 2009 and 2010 channeled through banks with high state-ownership.
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China has one of the biggest banking sectors in the world, with total assets equaling 245% of This paper considers three questions related to China's banking industry:
• Does the bank lending channel exist in China?
• What effects do capital requirements exert on the bank lending channel?
• What asymmetric effects arise from the bank lending channel?
We apply a one-step GMM estimator to a dynamic panel model based on individual bank data published by the PBoC. Our four main findings are as follows: (1) Chinese bank lending behaviors change as the PBoC adjusts monetary policy, (2) the big state banks and poorly capitalized banks are less likely to modify their lending behaviors in the face of a monetary shock, (3) the enactment of capital controls weakens bank lending channel effects, and (4) there is a significant asymmetric effect in transmission via the bank lending channel.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a brief overview of the related theoretical and empirical literature on bank lending channel. We develop a simple motivating model in section 3 to describe the effects of bank-specific variables on the sensitivities of bank lending to monetary policies. Section 4 presents our empirical results and section 5 concludes.
2 Literature review 2.1 Theoretical discussion of the bank lending channel
The theory of bank lending channel was first enunciated by Bernanke and Blinder (1988) .
Their CC-LM model assumes bank loans cannot be substituted perfectly for bonds, emphasizing that a change in monetary policy not only shifts the liquidity and money (LM) curve through affecting the money demand but also the commodity and credit (CC) curve by influencing credit supply. Peek & Rosengren (1995) develop a model of a bank's optimal loan supply, showing that capital-constrained and capital-unconstrained banks react differently to shifts in monetary policy. Capital constrained banks tend to increase their loan supply with an increase in the benchmark interest rate, while unconstrained banks decrease their optimal loan supply. Stein (1998) incorporates an adverse selection problem into the bank funding market, finding that the information asymmetry between banks and outside investors weakens bank lending channel effects. Bernanke et al. (1998) extend their discussion of the traditional bank
The role of the bank lending channel and impacts of stricter capital requirements on the Chinese banking industry 8 lending channel, providing a DSGE model to show "financial accelerator" effects. Here, tighter monetary policy affects the value of enterprise collateral, which increases the external financing premium and causes a decline in loan demand. Following this insight, Chami & Cosimano (2010) develop a dynamic "capital accelerator" model. Here, the tighter monetary stance increases deposit interest rate, causing bank profits and capital to shrink. This, in turn, causes a cutback in the bank loan supply in the next period. Tanaka (2002) develops a model of a bank's optimal loan supply. She finds that the optimal loan supply of a bank is positively and negatively related to the change of loan and bond interest rate. Increases in the capital requirement or poor capitalization of banks weaken the effect of the monetary transmission mechanism. Milne & Wood (2009) reconsider the bank lending channel, arguing that the effect of bank lending channel is ambiguous. The amplification effect only seems to occur when monetary tightening leads to an outflow of bank funds and a reduction in bank lending. Using multinational aggregated data, they further show that (with the exception of Italy) there is no evidence that bank deposits decrease more than lending in the face of tighter monetary policy.
In addition to the traditional bank lending channel, researchers have begun to turn their attention to the effect of endogenous bank capital in the transmission of policy via the bank lending channel. Markovic (2006) develops a DSGE model to show that after the implementation of contractionary monetary policy, bank profits shrink and three effects become manifest. The first is a "capital loss effect," whereby the bank needs to raise capital, so it launches a stock offering. This is interpreted as a bad signal to investors fearing dividend dilution (Myers & Majluf, 1984) . In seeking reassurances, investors demand higher returns. The second is an "adjustment cost effect," whereby potential investors are concerned that the bank has underestimated the adjustment, or transition, costs associated with bank financing and demand higher returns. Finally, there is a "default risk effect," whereby investors are spooked by a decrease in the capital adequacy ratio. As they see the soundness of the bank is threatened, they demand higher returns. These effects all lead to higher interest rates on loans granted by the bank, which, in turn, is likely to reduce the volume of bank lending. Drumond (2007) brings in the element of liquidity premium in the context of a monetary contraction. Here, banks are faced with shrinking profits and capital, so they need to raise liquidity. Households and investors seek higher interest on deposits or higher returns on bank stock in the face of the increasing risk of default. At the same time, the bank needs to be able to continue to attract deposits by keeping risk low and liquidity high, as well as stay at-BOFIT-Institute for Economies in Transition Bank of Finland BOFIT Discussion Papers 7/ 2013 9 tractive to investors by offering a decent return on equity. These conditions motivate the bank to increase its lending volume. Disyatat (2010) offers an alternative theoretical framework for the bank lending channel to that of Bernanke and Blinder (1988) . Focusing on the bank's balance sheet, he considers bank capital to be endogenous. Thus, a tightening of monetary policy reduces the bank's level of capitalization through decreases in its net interest margin, cash flow and asset valuations. Ultimately, these changes decrease the bank's credit supply.
2.2
Empirical studies of the bank lending channel
Empirical tests for the existence of the bank lending channel have been performed on many economies on a varying scale. Generally speaking, the empirical literature divides into two categories.
The first category is based on the time-series data using VAR-type models. Bernanke & Blinder (1992) , using aggregated US data, find that six to nine months after an increase on Federal Reserve fund rate, bank deposits and lending both decrease significantly. Kashyap et al. (1993) also work with the US aggregated data. They find a monetary contraction tends to be followed by a decline in aggregate bank lending. Kakes & Sturm (2002) consider the evidence for a bank lending channel in Germany using a VAR method. Alfaro et al. (2003) In recent years, researchers begin to study the bank lending channel on a larger set of aggregated data using a Factor Augmented Vector Auto Regression (FAVAR) method, which avoids the problem of sparse information sets typically generated by VAR models as noted by Bernanke et al. (2005) . Dave et al. (2009) use a FAVAR method to indentify the bank lending channel in the US, determining that the BLC is stronger than previously thought and that there may be other bank characteristics that could help improve identification of the BLC.
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The role of the bank lending channel and impacts of stricter capital requirements on the Chinese banking industry 10 Meanwhile, a consensus has emerged that use of aggregated data cannot disentangle credit demand from supply, preventing proper identification of the bank lending channel. To address this, authors began to study the bank lending channel based on the bank individual data − the second category of empirical studies. Several researchers also suggest that there may be asymmetric effects in the transmission of bank lending channel. Kishan & Opeila (2006) using US data, find that contractionary policy has a stronger effect than expansionary policy for poorly capitalized banks, which are less likely to increase their lending during periods of expansionary policy. There are few studies that use individual bank data to study the bank lending channel in China. Liu & Xie (2006) analyze the bank lending channel and the financial sector of China, but do not apply any econometric models. Most research is based on time-series data using a VAR or Structural VAR method (Xie, 2004; Zhao et al., 2007; Liu et al., 2009; Wang, 2010 
The role of the bank lending channel and impacts of stricter capital requirements on the Chinese banking industry 12 3 A motivating theoretical model Following Peek & Rosengren (1995) , Kashyap & Stein (1995) , and Tanaka (2002) , my goal here is to identify the effects of bank size, capitalization, and the strength of capital regulation on a bank's optimal loan supply under prevailing monetary policy conditions. We develop a model of a representative bank with three assets: Loan (L), Bond (B) and required reserves (R), as well as two categories of liabilities: Deposits (D) and Capital (K). Equation (1) is the balance sheet constraint:
On the asset side, the loan market is imperfectly competitive and banks have market power through increasing their loan stock by offering a lower interest rate L r . L r is the average interest rate on loan market; it is function of the benchmark interest rate b r . The relationship between L and L r yields Equation (2): easier to secure alternative external financing funds when confronted by a liquidity shock.
They are also likely hold a smaller percentage of bonds relative to deposits:
R stands for the required reserves held by the bank. 2 Assuming banks do not hold excessive reserves, bank reserves at the central bank are characterized by Equation (7):
On the liability side, recall D represents bank deposits. Assuming the deposit market is im- − over the prevailing market rate. Therefore, 1 e is positively related to bank size A:
1 e is also positively related to the level of capitalization K. This can be explained by the information asymmetry between the bank and depositors. The level of capitalization is a good reflection of a bank's willingness to invest in risky projects. Moreover, well capitalized banks will pay more when they sustain losses from risky assets, so depositors may consider weak capitalization as a deal-breaker in screening prospective banks. Banks with higher capital are expected to secure more deposits than poorly capitalized banks, giving inequality (10):
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Over the short run, capital level K is exogenous. The cost of holding capital K is K r , so we in-
is the probability that a bank is in violation of the capital regulation. θ is the capital requirement ratio and bond B is riskless, so the bank does not need to allocate additional capital to cover risk. L K θ is the inverse of the bank's capital ratio, so an increase in L K θ implies that the probability that the bank will violate the capital regulation ( )
V is the cost that a bank should pay if it fails to meet the capital requirement, which is usually very costly. Thus,
is the expected cost of violating the capital requirement. The bank's objective is to maximize its profit as shown in Equation (11):
w means the losses incurred by the non-performing loans, using Equations (1), (2), (4), (7), (12) is obtained:
Take the first-order condition with respect to L :
Use the second-order sufficient condition: 
If we drop the condition suggested in Peek & Rosengren (1995) , the optimal loan supply decreases in response to an increase in b r only when the following inequality holds:
This inequality means the instrument of benchmark interest rate only works when the interest rate sensitivity of the deposit market to the benchmark interest rate is greater than the linear combination of the sensitivities to both the loan and bond markets.
We further examine the effects of size, capitalization and compliance with capital requirements based on (15) and (16), and find that:
4 Following Peek & Rosengren (1995) , the benchmark interest rate b r will have equal effects on the interest rates of loan market L r , bond market and deposit market D r :
From (19) to (24), 4 the following conclusions can be drawn:
The marginal effects of bank asset on & Stein, 1995; Gambacorta & Mistrulli, 2004; and Juurikkala et al., 2011) , has been designed to test whether banks with different characteristics and under different regulatory conditions will react differently to monetary policy. The empirical model is given as Equation (25):
With i = 1 N (N = number of banks) and t = 1…T (t = quarters) and where:
DLoan it Growth rate of loans of bank i in quarter t, Lags of △Loan are included to describe the adjustment process of bank loan. As the bank lending channel focuses on the supply side of loan (Bernanke & Blinder, 1988) , GDP growth and CPI are included to capture the effects of credit demand.
It is difficult to quantify the monetary policy stance in China. The People's Bank of China (PBoC) has not traditionally used inflation targeting, implementing policy with a range of tools instead. Shu & Ng (2010) provide a detailed summary of the instruments used by the PBoC, as indicated in Table 1 . There are market-based, non-market based, quantity-based, and price-based instruments in the monetary toolkit. Thus, it would be unreasonable to characterize the monetary stance only from one indicator. We have selected four indicators to test the bank lending channel, including:
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• A quantity-and market-based indicator; required reserve ratio (RRR) for big financial institutions, which is adjusted frequently by the PBoC. This indicator is calculated on a daily weighted basis.
5
• A price-and market-based indicator, i.e. the benchmark one-year lending interest rate (BLR). It has been adjusted frequently by PBoC in recent years and is calculated on a daily weighted basis.
• A priced-based intermediate target indicator, i.e. the quarterly weighted overnight interbank repo rate. This is the rate most sensitive to changes in market liquidity.
• The narrative monetary stance indicator (MPV) compiled by Xiong (2012) .
6 This indicator is prepared by using -1, 0 and 1 to describe the stance of monetary policy, A value of 1 indicates tightening, 0 is neutral, and -1 means an expansionary or loosening stance. X it represents our three bank-specific variables: (1) capital ratio car it 7 , (2) asset size ta it , and (3) liquidity liq it . The variables car it and liq it are normalized as follows:
asset size ta it is normalized so as to remove its increasing trend: 
Data
A quarterly unbalanced panel from 27 commercial banks from 2000Q2 to 2011Q4 has been used to estimate the coefficients. The data of bank specific variables are collected from various sources. We complement the data available from B.V.D. Bankscope database by banklevel data collected by the Center of Bank Management, Wuhan University. The statistical description is in Table 2 . Table 2 suggests that the capital ratio and equity-to-asset ratio are 8 The equity-to-asset ratio, ea, is used as an alternative indicator of a bank's capitalization level.
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The role of the bank lending channel and impacts of stricter capital requirements on the Chinese banking industry 20 growing significantly, and the growth in the lending rate and the percentage of loans to total assets are on the decrease. This provides evidence of the effect of capital requirement and a trend towards financial disintermediation. The macroeconomic variables are taken from China Statistics Yearbook. Our sample banks account for over 65% of banking sector assets and 70 % of loans granted as of end-2011Q4.
To avoid spurious regressions, variables are tested for unit roots by Imm-Pesaran-
8 The results are in Table 3 , which show that all variables in the econometric model are stationary. GDP has a unit root -5.8943***(ADF) 0.0000 Notes: RRR-required reserve ratio, BLR-one-year lending rate, REPO-overnight interbank repo rate, MPVmonetary policy stance indicator, "D" stand for the first differences. 
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Methods of estimation
We use a one-step system GMM to estimate the coefficients in Equation (25), considering the lagged dependent variables in the dynamic panel, we hope to avoid the problem of endogeneity by adding lagged instruments. We use a one-step GMM estimator rather than a two-step estimator as it would cause downward-biased standard errors (Bond, 2002) . 9 All estimations are based on the STATA11. 10 In the sample, we have a number of banks (N = 27) and time span (T = 48 quarters). Following Kivet (1999) and Bruno (2005) , Equation (19) should prerferable be estimated with the LSDV method to correct for bias in the process of estimation when all explanatory variables are strictly exogenous. Since this is impossible here, we stick with our one-step GMM estimation. 
The response of loan growth to monetary policy
We omitted bank-specific variables in Equation (25) 11 Redarding the Sargan and Hansen tests, the null hypothesis in the model does not suffer from an overidentification problem. As for the AR(2) test, the null hypothesis the second-order residuals are not correlated. Therefore, the results are solid. Seasonal (quarterly) dummies and time trend are included, but not reported. In the initial model specification, we incorporated the CPI. It caused an over-identification problem and the signs were not significant, so the CPI was dropped. Sargan-p, Hansen-p and AR (2) 
The effects of bank-specific variables
We next examine the effects of bank-specific variables. The results for required reserve ratio (DRRR) and one-year benchmark interest rate (DBLR) are reported in Table 5 .The long-term coefficients of DRRR are significantly negative, i.e. a rise in the required reserve ratio leads to a significant decrease in growth rate of the loan stock. The long-term coefficient of GDP is significantly positive, suggesting the pro-cyclicality of bank credit behavior. The long-term coefficients of DRRR*ta are significant, and the positive sign means larger banks adjust their lending practices less than an average bank due to a change in the required reserve ratio. The interactions of required reserve ratio and dummy of capital requirement DRRR*cap are also positively significant. Thus, since the introduction of stricter capital requirements, the effect of required reserve ratio on the banks' credit supply has weakened. GDP*cap is significant. A negative sign here means that since stricter capital regulation, the pro-cyclicality of lending behavior has abated somewhat. This is not in line with the intuition that tighter capital regula-
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The role of the bank lending channel and impacts of stricter capital requirements on the Chinese banking industry 26 tion should increase the pro-cyclicality of bank credit behavior (Heid, 2007) . As for the interactions of DRRR*car, the sign is negative. This means that with an increase in the capital ratio, banks become more sensitive to changes in the required reserve ratio. The long-term coefficient, however, is not significant. As for interactions with the equity-to-asset ratio, DDRR*ea is negative and significant.
The long-term coefficient of DBLR is significantly negative, showing that an increase in the benchmark interest rate leads to a decline in bank credit growth. As for the interactions with the dummy of capital requirement, DBLR*cap is significantly positive. This suggests that after the enactment of the Basel I accord, banks have become less likely to respond to the changes of benchmark lending rate. All the other interactions of DBLR are not significant, which is in line with Koivu (2012) . The results show that the effects of benchmark interest rate on loan growth are not affected by bank-specific variables. As for the interactions of GDP, GDP*liq is significantly positive. Thus, highly liquid banks can inject more credit when the economy is in an upturn and less in a downturn. The long-term coefficients of GDP*ea are significantly negative, which means that banks with higher equity-to-asset ratios will inject less credit when the economy is in an upturn and less in a downturn. This has implications for counter-cyclical capital buffer behaviors.
The sum of lagged credit growth coefficients in Table 5 are significant and have a positive and significant impact on the current period loan supply. This seems to validate the choice of a dynamic estimation framework. All the models in Table 5 are valid in Sargan and Hansen over-identification tests with their p values greater than 0.1. The results of AR (2) tests with p-values greater than 0.1 also show that the model estimations are solid. Table 5 Loan growth: Long-run coefficients of GMM estimations with required reserves ratio and one-year lending rate as monetary policy indicators, full model Note: the bank specific variables, quarterly dummies and time trend are included in the GMM estimation, but the results are not reported here.
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The results of DREPO and MPV are presented in Table 6 . The long-term coefficient of DREPO is significantly negative, i.e. an increase in the interbank repo rate lead to a decrease in bank lending. The long-run coefficients of DREPO*liq and DREPO*car are significantly negative, so highly liquid and well capitalized banks are more affected by the change of overnight interbank repo rate. The sign of DREPO*ea also suggests this, but it is not statistically significant.
There is also evidence that, with stricter capital requirements, the effect of the interbank repo rate on bank credit growth has been weakened. The long-term coefficient of GDP*liq is positive and significant, i.e. highly liquid banks behave more pro-cyclically with regards to credit. GDP*car is negative and significant, i.e. well capitalized banks behave less pro-cyclically with regard to credit. GDP*cap is significantly negative, i.e. the introduction of tighter capital regulations eliminated a certain amount of pro-cyclical lending behavior.
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The long-run coefficient of MPV is significant and negative, so a tighter monetary stance leads to a decrease in credit growth. The long-term coefficient of MPV*ta is positive and significant, i.e. big banks seems to be less affected by the change of monetary stance. The signs of MPV*car and MPV*ea are also negative and significant, suggesting that better capitalized banks change their loan supply more than an average bank to accommodate monetary policy. The signs for the other variables are generally in line with the above-mentioned results.
The significance of We now test whether bank lending reacts asymmetrically to contractionary or expansionary monetary policy as suggested by Kishan & Opeila (2006) . The empirical specification is as follows:
All the other variables are the same as in Equation (25) 12 Detailed MPV characterizations are presented in Appendix A. 13 The other variables in Eq. 30 are included, but we do not report the results here.
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Note: Seasonal dummies, GDP, and its interactions are included, but not reported. F-statistics are in parenthesis. *,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level. (Numbers in the blank are the sums of the corresponding long term coefficients). The results for Equation 30 are presented in Table 7 . Note that both expansionary and contractionary monetary policies have significant effects on growth in lending. This is specifically seen from the significant F-tests of The primary goal of macroeconomic policy was to maintain the price stability. Efforts continued to slow growth of the money supply and gradually return to trend.
2011Q2 1
The primary goal of macroeconomic policy was to maintain the price stability. There was enhanced liquidity management and an effort to gradually return credit growth to normal levels. ( 
